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Sackett v. EPA: Does It Signal the End of Coercive 
CERCLA Enforcement? 
A HYPOTHETICAL 
Mr. Richards, the owner of a small auto-part manufacturing 
company, purchases an old factory building in Michigan. He plans 
to repurpose it, ideally without spending too much money. 
Unbeknownst to Richards, the factory was previously owned by an 
industrial chemical producer. After operating without incident for 
five years, Richards begins to receive cease-and-desist notices from 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA alleges that 
it has detected dangerous levels of chemicals in the soil under the 
factory, and it believes that Richards’s company is to blame. The 
EPA states that Richards may have violated the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), a federal statute regulating the cleanup and remediation 
of toxic waste sites.1 Settlement talks between Richards and the 
EPA break down when Richards denies that his company had 
“anything whatsoever to do with the release of those chemicals.” 
Using its “Enforcement First” policy,2 the EPA issues Richards a 
Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) charging him with a 
violation of CERCLA. Desperate, Richards makes a panicked call to 
his lawyer, Norman Smith, and tries to find a way out. “Look, 
Smith, can’t we just sue the EPA to get this order off our back?,” 
Richards asks. “Nope. You’ve landed in a whole mess of trouble,” 
Smith replies. “You have two choices—neither of them good. Either 
you can foot the bill for the cleanup now and try to get 
compensation later, or you can wait for the EPA to take us to court 
with an enforcement action. Until then, we can’t fight this thing.”3 
INTRODUCTION 
The above hypothetical is based on a real case4 and illustrates 
the profound difficulties faced by individuals and businesses issued 
UAOs by the EPA under CERCLA. CERCLA explicitly denies any 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by DAVID A. SAFRANEK. 
 1. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 2. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 127–28 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
“[Plaintiff] GE points to EPA’s ‘enforcement first’ policy, by which the agency 
issues UAOs whenever settlement negotiations fail . . . .” Id. 
 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2006). The hypothetical is based in part on Solid 
State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 4. See Solid State Circuits, 812 F.2d 383. 
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access to pre-enforcement judicial review of these EPA 
administrative orders, which have the force of law.5 Those who 
violate the terms of a UAO can be hit with massive fines that could 
reach $25,000 a day.6 Because fines are calculated from the day the 
UAO is issued, parties who refuse to comply could face multi-
million dollar contingent liabilities.7 Additionally, those who are 
found to “willfully violate” a UAO “[w]ithout sufficient cause” are 
subject to treble punitive damages.8 
Not surprisingly, distressed regulated parties have repeatedly 
challenged the constitutionality of both CERCLA and the EPA’s 
practice of issuing UAOs while allowing the potential fines and 
penalties to accumulate, alleging violations of their due process 
rights under the Fifth Amendment.9 Thus far, these challenges have 
not proven successful.10 Indeed, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2012 decision in Sackett v. EPA, the judicial support for non-
reviewable administrative orders, including CERCLA UAOs, 
seemed well settled and consistent across the majority of federal 
circuits.11 The use of such orders extends well beyond CERCLA and 
                                                                                                             
 5. By “force of law,” it is meant that a UAO alone is sufficient to create a 
cause of action for the EPA to bring suit in federal district court. See In re Katania 
Shipping Co., 8 E.A.D. 294 (EAB 1999).  
 6. See § 9606(b)(1). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id.; id. § 9607(c)(3). Punitive damages are capped at three times the 
total response cost. Id. For example, if the total response cost is $2 billion, punitive 
damages up to $6 billion may be sought by the EPA in an enforcement action.  
 9. Parties have challenged all of the following: (1) the constitutionality of 
treble punitive damages; (2) the constitutionality of non-reviewable UAOs; and (3) 
the pattern and practice of resorting to UAOs for enforcement in almost every 
instance. See infra Part I.E. 
 10. See infra Part I.E. The only successful constitutional challenge to 
CERCLA UAOs to date occurred in Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., in which the 
California District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the EPA’s 
imposition of daily fines against an oil company. See Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 
F. Supp. 69, 74–75 (C.D. Cal. 1984). However, the Aminoil decision was 
subsequently superseded by statute when Congress amended CERCLA to 
expressly prohibit the type of constitutional challenge brought by the plaintiffs in 
that case. Id. See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 SUPERFUND & BROWNFIELDS 
CLEANUP § 7:5 (Sept. 2012 Update) (describing the effects of the 1986 
amendments passed by Congress to expressly restrict pre-enforcement review of 
CERCLA UAOs). 
 11. Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Lowell 
Rothschild, Before and After Sackett v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
59-JUL FED. LAW. 46, 48 (2012) (“By 1995, the bar was so firmly in place that 
the Tenth Circuit simply cited the opinions issued by the Seventh, Fourth, and 
Sixth Circuit in its own three-page decision, stating that those cases were 
indistinguishable and finding no reason to rule differently than those courts had. 
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occurs in the context of other federal environmental statutes—
principally the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Clean Air Act 
(CAA).12 
In Sackett, a unanimous Supreme Court signaled its profound 
distaste for the EPA’s use of non-reviewable orders.13 Although 
Sackett was decided in the context of the CWA, the ruling represents 
a major shift from the traditional judicial support for non-reviewable 
orders, which have been used by the EPA for decades to enforce the 
CWA, in addition to CERCLA.14 
This Comment argues that Sackett v. EPA discredits the 
efficiency-based arguments used to justify non-reviewable UAOs, 
thus rendering them unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause. Further, this Comment suggests that the due 
process deficiency of CERCLA UAOs can only be remedied by 
providing greater access to pre-enforcement administrative hearings. 
In Part I, this Comment first examines how Sackett v. EPA 
represents a fundamental shift away from the previously widespread 
judicial agreement in favor of barring pre-enforcement review of 
compliance orders under the CWA. Part I continues by examining 
the key cases that interpret the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause as applied to CERCLA and the primary arguments that have 
been unsuccessfully used to challenge CERCLA UAOs in the past. 
In Part II, this Comment challenges the efficiency-based arguments 
that courts have used to justify the prohibition of all pre-
enforcement judicial review of UAOs. Part II argues that the 
absolute bar on review is unnecessary to preserve the utility of 
UAOs and that meaningful alternatives to non-reviewable orders 
already exist within the framework of CERCLA enforcement. 
Finally, Part III of this Comment proposes that a pre-enforcement 
evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge is the best 
means available to both protect the due process rights of regulated 
parties and minimize the EPA’s administrative costs. This solution 
protects regulated parties by providing them with a meaningful 
opportunity to present evidence and challenge the EPA’s claims 
                                                                                                             
 
The Tenth Circuit noted that the plaintiff's ‘policy argument that it should not be 
necessary to violate an EPA order and risk civil and criminal penalties to obtain 
judicial review’ was ‘well taken, but did not offer them a better option.’” (quoting 
Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 566 (1995))). 
 12. See Rothschild, supra note 11, at 48. 
 13. See Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012). 
 14. Id. 
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while providing a less expensive and time-consuming alternative to 
judicial proceedings before an Article III court. 
I. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NON-REVIEWABLE ORDERS 
To best understand the history of non-reviewable administrative 
orders such as CERCLA UAOs, it is most helpful to start with the 
broadest and arguably most important limitation on the power of 
government agencies: the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.15 
The right to due process of law prior to a deprivation of property by 
the government is a fundamental principle that underlies many 
crucial legal challenges that have been launched against the EPA’s 
use of UAOs to enforce the terms of CERCLA.16 Thus, this 
Comment first outlines the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
including the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence applying due 
process rights to the area of administrative law.17 After addressing 
the Fifth Amendment’s role in limiting property deprivations by 
government agencies, this Part examines the relevant sections and 
legislative history of CERCLA18 and discusses several of the key 
decisions that have shaped the interpretation of CERCLA’s bar on 
pre-enforcement review.19 Finally, this Part presents and thoroughly 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Sackett v. EPA.20 
A. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states that “[n]o 
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”21 In the area of CERCLA (and other federal 
environmental statutes such as the CWA), the primary Fifth 
Amendment concern is deprivation of property without due process 
of law, which clearly includes fines, penalties, and contingent 
liabilities.22  
                                                                                                             
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 16. See infra Part I.D. 
 17. See infra Part I.B.1–2. 
 18. See infra Part I.C. 
 19. See infra Part I.D. 
 20. See infra Part I.E. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 22. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 30 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 
610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that contingent effects such as reduced 
stock price and damaged brand value are protected property interests under the 
Fifth Amendment). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 128 (D.C. 
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B. Fifth Amendment Cases 
1. Ex Parte Young 
Ex Parte Young is the case most commonly cited to support the 
argument that the EPA’s use of CERCLA UAOs violates the Fifth 
Amendment due process rights of regulated parties.23 Ex Parte 
Young is an important, early due process case involving railroad 
rate-fixing statutes.24 The controversy arose out of a rate-fixing 
statute passed by Minnesota in 1903 that fixed the maximum rate for 
passenger tickets at two cents per mile and established a schedule of 
other maximum rates for different types of cargo.25 Most 
importantly, the statute carried severe monetary penalties for each 
violation, with escalating fines for each subsequent penalty.26 
The rule announced by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Young is 
that a statutory scheme violates Fifth Amendment due process if 
“the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and 
imprisonment so severe as to intimidate [an affected party] from 
resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation.”27 The 
basic due process argument of Ex Parte Young, used against 
CERCLA in later cases, is that statutory fines, when compounded 
with punitive damages, are so enormous that they discourage 
regulated parties from even attempting to challenge the EPA’s 
administrative orders.28 
                                                                                                             
 
Cir. 2010) (overruling this interpretation and denying that such contingent effects 
are constitutionally cognizable property interests). 
 23. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 390–91 (8th Cir. 
1987); Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 74–75 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Jackson, 
595 F. Supp. 2d at 13. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), formed a core part of 
the plaintiffs’ arguments in all of these cases.  
 24. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123. 
 25. Id. at 127. 
 26. Id. In pertinent part, the Minnesota statute at issue in Ex Parte Young 
provided that a violator “shall be punished by a find [sic] of not less than $2,500, 
nor more than $5,000 for the first offense, and not less than $5,000 nor more than 
$10,000 for each subsequent offense.” Id. One prominent historical dollar 
calculator provides an “economic power” value of $5,010,000 in 2012 dollars for 
$10,000 in 1908. See MEASURING WORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com/us 
compare/relativevalue.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) [http://perma.cc/WPW3-
AP32] (archived June 2, 2014). Although a rough estimate, this figure provides 
some sense of the magnitude of the fines at issue in Ex Parte Young. See id. 
 27. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 147. 
 28. See Solid State Circuits, Inc., 812 F.2d at 390–91; Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. 
Supp. at 74–75; Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 13. 
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2. Mathews v. Eldridge 
Decided more than half a century after Ex Parte Young, 
Mathews v. Eldridge29 is another important Supreme Court decision 
that has been employed to both undermine and support the 
constitutionality of CERCLA UAOs.30 Mathews, decided in 1965, 
established the basic requirements of due process in the area of 
administrative law.31 The case involved a dispute over Social 
Security disability benefits.32 The Social Security Administration 
made a final determination that Mr. Eldridge’s disability had come 
to an end and denied his request to extend his eligibility.33 Mr. 
Eldridge challenged the determination on the grounds that he had 
not been afforded an evidentiary hearing to dispute the Agency’s 
final decision and present evidence to support his claim.34  
Reversing the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court held that Mr. Eldridge was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause before the termination of his disability benefits.35 According 
to the Mathews Court, “The fundamental requirement of due process 
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”36 However, the Court went on to discuss the 
many differences, both in form and function, between the judicial 
system and administrative agencies.37 Thus, the Court cautioned 
against the “wholesale transplantation” of strict rules of evidence 
and procedure that have evolved in Article III courts but may be 
inappropriate for agencies in many circumstances.38 Looking at the 
situation presented in Mathews, in which the Social Security 
Administration had to efficiently process thousands of claims, the 
Court concluded that “[t]he judicial model of an evidentiary hearing 
is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of 
                                                                                                             
 29. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 30. See Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 21–38. In that case, the plaintiff–
corporation argued that Mathews mandated greater access to judicial review. Id. at 
20. The D.C. District Court disagreed and ruled that, although Mathews provided 
the controlling test, Mathews actually indicated that no pre-enforcement process 
whatsoever was due to regulated parties issued a UAO under CERCLA. Id. at 38. 
 31. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325. 
 32. Id. at 323. 
 33. Id. at 323–24. 
 34. Id. at 323. 
 35. Id. at 320–21. 
 36. Id. at 333. 
 37. Id. at 348. 
 38. Id. 
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decision-making in all circumstances.”39 Instead, the Court proposed 
a four-factor test to determine whether access to an evidentiary 
hearing must be provided: 
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification 
of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: [1] First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; [2] second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] finally, 
the Government’s interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.40 
The Court applied the first three factors to Mr. Eldridge’s claims 
and found that, although Eldridge did have a significant interest in 
the continuation of his Social Security benefits, the risk of error 
imposed by making final determinations based only on a medical 
officer’s report was low and the cost of adding additional 
evidentiary hearings would be an excessive burden on the Agency.41  
Finally, the Court reached the fourth factor—the public policy 
balance: “In striking the appropriate due process balance the [fourth 
and] final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This includes 
the administrative burden and other societal costs that would be 
associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an 
evidentiary hearing . . . .”42 In the context of Social Security 
benefits, the Court reasoned that it was more important to preserve 
the resources of the public benefits program than to impose the costs 
required to provide an evidentiary hearing every time benefits are 
denied.43 While noting that financial cost alone was not a controlling 
factor in its decision, the Court concluded that the overall burden 
created by additional procedures was not in the public interest.44 
C. CERCLA and Its Enforcement Mechanisms 
Originally passed in 1980, CERCLA was designed to force 
polluters to pay for the cleanup and remediation of environmental 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 334–35. 
 41. Id. at 340–47. 
 42. Id. at 347. 
 43. Id. at 349. 
 44. Id. at 348–49. 
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damage caused by the release of toxic substances.45 Also commonly 
known as the “Superfund” law, CERCLA was created in response to 
public outrage at several nationally prominent ecological disasters in 
the 1970s, particularly the infamous Love Canal disaster, which 
occurred in Lewiston, New York, in 1978.46 As passed by Congress 
in 1980, CERCLA was intended to create long-term liability for acts 
of industrial pollution and to establish an industry-funded trust, or 
“Superfund,” to pay for the cleanup of sites where the polluter was 
no longer solvent or could not be found.47 
Under CERCLA section 106, the EPA is given three potential 
enforcement methods: (1) conduct the cleanup itself and bring suit 
to recover the costs; (2) bring an enforcement action in federal 
district court; or (3) issue a UAO to any potentially responsible party 
(PRP).48 CERCLA section 106 also defines the procedures for 
issuance of UAOs.49 Although CERCLA grants the President of the 
United States the authority to issue UAOs to PRPs, presidents have 
always delegated this authority to the EPA in its capacity as a 
federal agency within the executive branch.50 Any person who 
violates a section 106 UAO can be fined up to $25,000 for every day 
of the violation.51 The EPA may seek punitive damages equal to 
three times the total response cost from anyone who “willfully 
violates” a UAO.52 
                                                                                                             
 45. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 46. Elizabeth Ann Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses 
Left?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 387–88 (1988) (“In 1978, President Carter 
declared a state of emergency at Love Canal, an upstate New York neighborhood 
which had been developed above an abandoned hazardous waste site. The long-
buried chemicals on the site had contaminated the water supply in the area and 
were seeping into the surface ground near the homes. Inhabitants in the area 
reported a high incidence of health problems ranging from headaches to birth 
defects. These health effects were traced to the presence of hazardous wastes on 
the site.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006). 
 49. See id. § 9606(b)–(d). 
 50. See id. § 9606(a). See also Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139, 1141–42 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
 51. § 9606(b)(1). 
 52. Id. § 9607(c)(3). The standard of “willful violation” implies either 
intentional or reckless disregard for an order issued under CERCLA. Id. When a 
party is found guilty of willful violation, “[s]uch person may be liable to the 
United States for punitive damages in an amount at least equal to, and not more 
than three times, the amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result of such 
failure to take proper action.” Id. 
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Section 113(h) creates a pre-enforcement bar to judicial review 
of UAOs.53 This bar is “jurisdictional” in nature, purporting to 
divest federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims 
at all.54 It is important to note, however, that section 113(h) is a 
product of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act (SARA), which amended CERCLA to include the explicit pre-
enforcement review bar.55 Originally, CERCLA was designed in 
much the same manner as the CWA and the CAA and did not 
contain an express, statutory bar against pre-enforcement review but 
only a judicially created bar.56 
D. Fifth Amendment Due Process Challenges to CERCLA 
1. Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S. EPA 
Decided by California’s Central District Court in 1984, Aminoil, 
Inc. v. U.S. EPA was an important pre-SARA due process challenge 
to the judicially created pre-enforcement review bar in CERCLA.57 
In Aminoil, two oil companies, Aminoil, Inc. and McAuley Oil, 
brought suit to enjoin the assessment of daily fines for 
noncompliance with UAOs that the EPA had issued against them, 
arguing that the EPA’s denial of a pre-enforcement hearing violated 
their Fifth Amendment due process rights.58 Although the court 
recognized the existence of a pre-enforcement bar to judicial review 
of specific UAOs, it found that the plaintiffs’ claims presented a 
constitutional challenge to CERCLA as a whole and concluded that 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. § 9613(h). 
 54. See id. (stating in pertinent part that “[n]o Federal court shall have 
jurisdiction under Federal law . . . to review any challenges to removal or remedial 
action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any [unilateral 
administrative] order issued under section 9606(a) of this title”). 
 55. O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 7:5. “In the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA), Congress enacted far reaching prohibitions on pre-
enforcement review to ensure that the courts did not have a meaningful role in the 
remedy selection and review process.” Id. 
 56. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 71 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Both Aminoil and 
Solid State Circuits were decided before the passage of SARA. See Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1329 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the 
enactment of SARA in 1986 did not apply to actions filed before October 17, 
1986, the date that SARA came into effect). Nevertheless, both courts noted that 
judicial precedents, combined with evidence of congressional intent, created a pre-
enforcement review bar, at least as to challenges against specific UAOs. See Solid 
State Circuits, Inc., 812 F.2d at 388; Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. Supp. at 71.  
 57. Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 69. 
 58. Id. at 71. 
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it could properly exercise jurisdiction over the case.59 Granting a 
preliminary injunction against the EPA’s assessment of fines or 
punitive damages, the court used the Mathews test to find that the 
lack of pre-enforcement review violated due process.60 Instead of 
applying all four factors described by the Supreme Court, the 
Aminoil court consolidated the test into three factors: (1) the private 
interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation, and (3) the 
government and public interest at stake.61 
Looking to the first factor of Mathews—the private interest at 
stake—the court stated that the private interest was the fundamental 
right to be heard, rather than a mere financial interest in avoiding 
payment of penalties.62 Further, the Aminoil court found that the 
EPA’s use of UAOs fit within Ex Parte Young’s prohibition of 
coercive statutory schemes that deter legal challenges through 
massive fines and penalties: “[T]hat right [to judicial review] is 
merely nominal and illusory if the party affected can appeal to the 
courts only at the risk of having to pay penalties so great that it is 
better to yield to orders of uncertain legality rather than to ask for 
the protection of the law.”63 The court thus found a way to shoehorn 
Ex Parte Young directly into the Mathews test, leading to a 
fundamentally different conclusion than later cases challenging 
CERCLA UAOs, such as GE IV.64 
After finding that CERCLA UAOs, at least as used by the EPA, 
fit within the prohibition of Ex Parte Young, the court proceeded to 
analyze the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation.65 
Avoiding a lengthy discussion of the relative risk of error, the 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 72. 
 60. Id. at 74. 
 61. See id. (“In the case at bar, this Court must weigh: (1) plaintiffs’ interest 
in seeking judicial review of the administrative order without the deterrent effect 
of significant sanctions if they are ultimately unsuccessful, (2) the risk that 
plaintiffs may be coerced into complying with the administrative order and be 
precluded from asserting what may have been meritorious defenses, and (3) the 
government’s and public’s interest in addressing emergency hazardous waste 
situations promptly and effectively.”). Note that the court created this formula by 
combining the third and fourth factors from Mathews, joining the governmental 
and public interests into a single factor. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
333–48 (1976). 
 62. Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 74–75. 
 63. Id. at 75 (quoting Wadley S. Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 661 
(1915)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(considering GE’s argument under Ex Parte Young as completely severable from 
the Mathews analysis). 
 65. Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 75. 
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Aminoil court simply stated that the plaintiffs faced a “substantial 
risk” that they would be erroneously deprived of any funds used to 
respond to the alleged CERCLA violations.66 The court concluded 
that this financial cost was a sufficient property interest to trigger 
Fifth Amendment due process protection.67 
Turning to the third and final Mathews factor, the court admitted 
that “[t]he government’s interest in the threat of significant sanctions 
also deserves serious consideration.”68 The court concluded that the 
government does have a legitimate interest in compelling quick 
cleanup of industrial pollution and avoiding costly litigation.69 
Despite these powerful governmental interests, the court ruled that 
Aminoil was “likely to succeed” in its constitutional challenge to 
CERCLA’s pre-enforcement review bar because, “[a]lthough the 
government’s interest in handling emergency waste situations in an 
efficacious manner is significant, this Court is not convinced that 
this interest could not be addressed through a scheme that 
nevertheless provides the most rudimentary elements necessary to 
satisfy due process.”70 Although Aminoil left these “rudimentary 
elements” undefined, in light of subsequent cases it appears that the 
court was referring to administrative hearings before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ), rather than full access to Article III 
courts, which would be far more expensive.71 
2. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A. 
Decided by the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals three years 
after Aminoil, Solid State Circuits v. E.P.A. was another high-profile 
due process challenge to the EPA’s use of CERCLA UAOs.72 The 
Solid State Circuits case grew out of a 1985 UAO issued jointly to 
two Missouri corporations, Solid State Circuits, Inc. and Paradyne 
Corp.73 In that UAO, the EPA alleged that chemicals used by the 
two corporations for copper plating at their Republic, Missouri, 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 76. 
 71. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 38 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(rejecting the feasibility of judicial review of UAOs but subsequently addressing 
the possibility that adjudications before an ALJ or presiding officer could be used 
instead). 
 72. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 73. Id. at 385–86. 
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plant had leached into the surrounding soil and posed an imminent 
threat to the town’s groundwater supply.74 
The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a ruling that both the pre-
enforcement review bar and the treble punitive damages portions of 
CERCLA violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights.75 The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims 
using the rule of Ex Parte Young and found that a judicial gloss on 
CERCLA was necessary to save the punitive damages provision 
from violating due process.76 The court recognized that a “good 
faith defense” against the imposition of punitive damages must be 
made available to regulated parties who have an “objectively 
reasonable belief” that the UAO issued against them is legally 
incorrect.77 Thus, while the court ultimately upheld CERCLA as 
constitutional, it had to reach far beyond the plain language of the 
statute to do so.78 Evidently, the Eighth Circuit viewed CERCLA as 
teetering on the very edge of violating due process protections.79 
3. The General Electric Co. v. Jackson Litigation 
The General Electric Co. v. Jackson case was a post-SARA 
constitutional challenge to the EPA’s use of CERCLA UAOs.80 The 
challenge was brought by GE in response to some 68 UAOs issued 
to GE by the EPA under CERCLA over a period of years.81 This 
Comment focuses on the final two decisions in GE’s long-running 
series of appeals. First, it examines the D.C. District Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 385. 
 76. Id. at 391. The Eighth Circuit explained the requirements of Ex Parte 
Young this way: “[T]o pass constitutional requirements, the standard must provide 
parties served with EPA clean-up orders a real and meaningful opportunity to test 
the validity of the order.” Id. 
 77. See id. at 392–93. 
 78. Id. at 392 (“[W]e hold that if neither CERCLA nor applicable EPA 
regulations or policy statements provides the challenging party with meaningful 
guidance as to the validity or applicability of the EPA order, Ex Parte Young and 
its progeny require that the burden rest with the EPA to show that the challenging 
party lacked an objectionably reasonable belief in the validity or applicability of a 
clean-up order.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 610 
F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 81. Id. at 12–13. 
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decision (GE IV), followed by the final appeal to the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals (GE V).82  
i. General Electric Co. v. Jackson (GE IV) 
In GE IV, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
considered both a facial constitutional challenge against CERCLA 
and a claim that the EPA’s “pattern and practice” of issuing UAOs 
violated GE’s due process rights.83 The first claim essentially 
repeated the plaintiffs’ action in Solid State Circuits, and the 
plaintiffs argued that the massive fines and punitive damages 
provisions of CERCLA rendered the statute unconstitutional under 
the rule of Ex Parte Young because they dissuaded GE from even 
trying to challenge the validity of the EPA’s order.84 The court 
dismissed this claim, ruling that judicial discretion over the 
imposition of punitive damages formed a well-recognized exception 
to Ex Parte Young and satisfied the requirements of due process.85 
GE’s second claim alleged that the EPA’s “pattern and practice” 
of resorting to UAOs in almost every instance to enforce CERCLA 
also violated due process.86 GE’s argument in support of the pattern 
and practice claim was based on the economics of publicly traded 
companies.87 When reduced to its essence, GE’s argument asserted 
that the mere issuance of a CERCLA UAO damages a public 
company’s property, provoking sharp declines in stock price, 
tarnishing the brand’s value in the minds of the public, and 
ultimately reducing the company’s all-important ability to attract 
future investment.88 
The GE IV court analyzed GE’s pattern-and-practice claim 
through the lens of the four-factor Mathews test.89 Applying the first 
factor, the court expressed doubts about the $76.4 million loss that 
the company claimed was a result of the UAO issued against it but 
ultimately ruled that the reduction in stock price suffered by GE did 
                                                                                                             
 82. To maintain internal consistency, the GE decisions in this Comment 
follow the numbering scheme recognized by the D.C. District Court, which 
labeled the decision being appealed from the court below as “GE III.” See id. at 
13. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13. 
 85. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13. 
 86. Id. at 13. 
 87. Id. at 21–22. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
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qualify as a protected property interest: “The Court is persuaded that 
noncomplying PRPs suffer a significant decrease in brand and 
market value, albeit something less than $76.4 million. The Court 
will proceed with the Mathews . . . assessment based on that 
estimate of the private interest impacted by noncompliance.” 90  
Looking to the private interest at stake, the court reasoned that, 
although the potential financial loss resulting from a UAO is very 
large, not all regulated parties will be affected to the same degree.91 
As the court noted, some smaller companies cannot survive even 
one UAO and will likely be put out of business, either due to the 
cost of compliance or the penalties accruing from noncompliance.92 
Overall, the court concluded that the high cost of complying with a 
UAO ($4 million on average), 93 when combined with the range of 
potential collateral losses (stock price reduction and brand value 
damage), constituted a significant private interest.94 
The court then examined the government’s interest in prompt 
action and in avoiding additional pre-deprivation process.95 
Highlighting evidence that the average response time to a CERCLA 
waste site is eight years, the court found that the EPA lacked a 
“special need for very prompt action.”96 Assessing the government’s 
interest in avoiding additional pre-deprivation process, the court 
found that the costs of providing access to Article III courts in every 
case would be excessive given the high volume of UAOs issued by 
the EPA.97  
However, the court also identified a lower-cost alternative to 
judicial review before an Article III court—an administrative 
hearing before an ALJ or presiding officer.98 Because the attendant 
                                                                                                             
 90. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 30. 
 91. Id. at 30.  
 92. Id. (“UAOs could put some PRPs out of business. For other PRPs, UAOs 
may affect operations, like whether to bid for new projects or to hire additional 
employees.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. (“[A] general conclusion is possible: although the private interests are 
less constitutionally significant because they are primarily financial, they are 
sufficiently large and have enough potential collateral effects to constitute weighty 
private interests.”). 
 95. Id. at 32. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 33 (“The cost of the additional process also depends on how often 
the government must provide it. Between August 16, 1982 and May 25, 2006—a 
period of 285 months—EPA issued 1,705 UAOs to more than 5,400 PRPs. On 
average, then, EPA has issued approximately six UAOs to nineteen PRPs every 
month.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 98. See, e.g., id. at 38. 
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costs are less, the court reasoned that the EPA has a lower interest in 
avoiding administrative hearings.99 Nevertheless, the court 
concluded that the overall cost of allowing access to any evidentiary 
hearing in the CERCLA UAO context would add large 
administrative costs, projecting that many regulated parties would 
choose to challenge UAOs if offered any opportunity to do so.100 
Turning to the fourth and final Mathews factor, the district court 
assessed the risk of erroneous deprivation of property resulting from 
the EPA’s use of UAOs.101 The court found that of 68 UAOs issued 
to GE by the EPA, only 5 contained evidence indicating that they 
were issued in error.102 Pointing to precedents from the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits, the court called this 4.4% rate of error 
“acceptable.”103 Focusing on what it perceived as a low rate of 
erroneous deprivation, the court concluded that even administrative 
hearings before a presiding officer or ALJ are too burdensome and 
costly to impose on the EPA when it issues a UAO under 
CERCLA.104 
ii. General Electric Co. v. Jackson (GE V) 
Decided in 2010, General Electric Co. v. Jackson (GE V)105 was 
the appeal of the district court’s decision in GE IV to the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals and marked the culmination of this long 
line of constitutional challenges to CERCLA.106 Once again, the 
legal precedent used to support the argument that UAOs violated 
due process was Ex Parte Young.107 The D.C. Circuit resolved GE’s 
facial challenge somewhat differently than the Eighth Circuit did in 
Solid State Circuits.108 In GE V, the court found that CERCLA 
section 106 (governing UAOs) fit within not just one but two well-
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. (“At first glance, the burden on the government interest appears 
minimal. For any given UAO, a hearing before a presiding officer would add only 
weeks or a few months to an issuance process that usually takes years. Moreover, 
the costs of a single hearing before a presiding officer are minimal, especially 
considering the size of the private interests at stake.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 100. See id. at 39. 
 101. Id. at 33. 
 102. Id. at 37. 
 103. Id.  
 104. See id. at 36–38. 
 105. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011). 
 106. See id. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, GE’s long series of 
appeals was brought to a close. 
 107. Id. at 119. 
 108. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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recognized exceptions to the rule of Ex Parte Young.109 The court 
concluded that where the fines and punitive damages are imposed at 
the discretion of an Article III judge, Fifth Amendment due process 
is satisfied.110 Additionally, the court noted that Solid State Circuits 
ruled that plaintiffs benefit from a good faith defense to the 
imposition of punitive damages.111 
Although GE argued that the D.C. Circuit should follow the 
district court below and apply the Mathews test to resolve its pattern 
and practice claim, the D.C. Circuit rejected this approach, holding 
that GE had not demonstrated a sufficient protected property interest 
to support the claim.112 The court also rejected the findings of GE’s 
study of CERCLA UAOs and dismissed the district court’s reliance 
on that evidence.113 The GE V court thus dodged the question of 
whether the Mathews test mandated greater access to evidentiary 
hearings in the CERCLA context, providing no guidance as to 
whether the Mathews analysis in GE IV was correct.114 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 109. See, e.g., Jackson, 610 F.3d at 117–19. 
 110. Id. at 118 (“Courts have also held that ‘there is no constitutional violation 
if the imposition of penalties is subject to judicial discretion.’” (quoting Wagner 
Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1986))).  
 111. Id. at 118–19 (“[C]ERCLA’s ‘sufficient cause’ defense is constitutionally 
equivalent to a good faith defense and thus satisfies due process[.]” (quoting Solid 
State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 391–92 (8th Cir. 1987))).  
 112. Id. at 120–21. The court attacked GE’s reliance on “consequential 
impacts” to establish its property interest: “GE’s case boils down to this: by 
declaring that a PRP is responsible for cleaning up a hazardous waste site, a UAO 
harms the PRPs reputation, and the market, in turn, devalues its stock, brand, and 
credit rating. Viewed this way, GE’s argument is foreclosed by Paul v. Davis.” Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 113. Id. at 128. The study surveyed all the reported UAOs issued by the EPA 
under CERCLA over a period of several years. Id. Out of 1,638 parties issued 
UAOs in the study period, only 75 or some 4.6% did not choose voluntary 
compliance with their respective UAOs. Id. However, the court found that the low 
rates of noncompliance could be easily explained: “[R]ecipients may be 
complying in large numbers not because they feel coerced, but because they 
believe that UAOs are generally accurate and would withstand judicial review.” 
Id. 
 114. Id. (“Thus, because we have held that these consequential effects do not 
qualify as constitutionally protected property interests . . . we need not—indeed, 
we may not—apply Mathews v. Eldridge to determine what process is due. In 
other words, even if GE is correct that EPA’s implementation of CERCLA results 
in more frequent and less accurate UAOs, the company has failed to identify any 
constitutionally protected property interest that could be adversely affected by 
such errors.”). 
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E. Sackett v. EPA 
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari on GE V in 2011, it 
appeared that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals would have the 
final word on CERCLA’s pre-enforcement review bar.115 From then 
on, it seemed, regulated parties would simply have to accept the idea 
of non-reviewable UAOs and punishing fines for noncompliance. 
Yet remarkably, only one year later the Supreme Court decided a 
case that cast considerable doubt on the EPA’s reliance on non-
reviewable orders as an enforcement mechanism. That case was 
Sackett v. EPA,116 and although it was technically decided under the 
aegis of the CWA, the reasoning used by the Court, and especially 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, casts grave doubts on the legal 
underpinnings of GE V.117  
1. Facts of the Case 
The controversy in Sackett began when Michael and Chantell 
Sackett started to excavate and fill part of their 0.63 acre home site 
located near Priest Lake, Idaho.118 Unfortunately, the Sacketts’ 
home construction project ran into a seemingly insurmountable 
obstacle—a letter from the EPA. On November 26, 2007, the EPA 
issued a compliance order.119 That compliance order classified the 
Sacketts’ home site on Priest Lake, Idaho, as a “wetland” under the 
Clean Water Act (CWA) and mandated that they remove all the 
gravel fill material and restore the land to its original condition, 
putting the construction of their home on hold indefinitely.120 Even 
worse for the Sacketts, the compliance order threatened massive 
fines for any violation—up to $75,000 a day, every day.121 
 
                                                                                                             
 115. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011). 
 116. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012). 
 117. See infra Part I.E.4–5. 
 118. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. 1367. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (granting EPA’s administrator jurisdiction over 
“navigable waters of the United States”); see also Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370–71 
(discussing the ambiguous reach of this nebulous term); Rapanos v. United States, 
547 U.S. 715 (2006) (holding that even freshwater wetlands not adjacent to 
navigable waters could be covered by the CWA). 
 121. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (“If the owners do not do the EPA’s bidding, 
they may be fined up to $75,000 per day ($37,500 for violating the Act and 
another $37,500 for violating the compliance order).”). 
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2. Legal Background 
At first, the Sacketts requested an administrative hearing with 
the EPA to review the compliance order, which was promptly 
denied by the EPA.122 Next, the Sacketts filed suit in federal district 
court in Idaho, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.123 The 
district court granted the EPA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, finding that judicial precedent clearly established 
that Congress intended to prohibit pre-enforcement judicial review 
of EPA compliance orders issued under the CWA.124 
The Sacketts appealed the district court’s dismissal to the U.S. 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Deciding the case de novo, the 
Ninth Circuit closely reviewed both the legislative history of the 
CWA125 and the decisions of other federal circuits on pre-
enforcement review of CWA compliance orders.126 Ultimately, the 
court concluded that “[i]n this assessment, we do not work from a 
blank slate. Every circuit that has confronted this issue has held that 
the CWA implicitly precludes judicial review of compliance orders 
until the EPA brings an enforcement action in federal district 
court.”127 Rejecting the Sacketts’ claim that the lack of an 
administrative hearing violated their Fifth Amendment due process 
rights, the court ruled that post hoc judicial discretion over the 
imposition of penalties satisfied due process.128 
                                                                                                             
 122. See Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 123. Id. (“[The Sacketts] challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and 
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); 
(2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts’ procedural due process 
rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an “any information available” standard that 
is unconstitutionally vague.”). 
 124. See id. at 1141. 
 125. Id. at 1144 (“[W]e consider the legislative history of the CWA. The 
enforcement provisions of the CWA were modeled on enforcement provisions in 
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), and many courts have relied on similar provisions in 
the CAA in concluding that the CWA precludes pre-enforcement judicial review 
of compliance orders.”).  
 126. Id. at 1143 (“In this assessment, we do not work from a blank slate. Every 
circuit that has confronted this issue has held that the CWA impliedly precludes 
judicial review of compliance orders until the EPA brings an enforcement action 
in federal district court.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1146 (“The amount of the penalty for noncompliance with a CWA 
compliance order is to be determined by a court and is determined on the basis of 
six factors: (1) the seriousness of the violation, (2) the economic benefit resulting 
from the violation, (3) any history of CWA violations, (4) good-faith efforts to 
comply, (5) the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and (6) such other 
matters as justice may require.”). 
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3. Issues 
When the case arrived before the Supreme Court, the issues 
were narrowed by the Court’s grant of certiorari.129 In its grant, the 
Court refined the controversy to two major questions: whether pre-
enforcement review was allowed under the CWA and whether the 
Sacketts’ inability to seek pre-enforcement judicial review of the 
compliance order violated their procedural due process rights under 
the Fifth Amendment.130 
4. Opinion 
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which held that there 
was insufficient evidence of congressional intent in the CWA to 
deny judicial review of EPA compliance orders and that the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) creates a strong presumption 
favoring judicial review where Congress has not spoken to the 
issue.131 Scalia said that “finality” in the APA context essentially 
depends on whether the Agency is willing to reconsider its 
determinations.132 Here, the EPA denied the Sacketts an agency 
hearing and was unwilling to reconsider, so the compliance order 
was final and judicially reviewable.133 Scalia also disagreed with the 
government’s claims that pre-enforcement review of the EPA’s 
orders would harm enforcement of the CWA134 and greatly reduce 
the Agency’s efficiency.135 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence sought to narrow the majority 
opinion, establishing that the Court did not reach the issue of 
whether the compliance order was correct, merely that the Sacketts 
                                                                                                             
 129. Sackett v. E.P.A., 131 S. Ct. 3092 (2011). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012). 
 132. See id. at 1371–72. Scalia noted that the Agency had shut down the 
formal negotiation process and solidified its position against the Sacketts: “The 
mere possibility that an agency might reconsider in light of ‘informal discussion’ 
and invited contentions of inaccuracy does not suffice to make an otherwise final 
agency action nonfinal.” Id. at 1372. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1374 (“Compliance orders will remain an effective means of 
securing prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no 
substantial basis to question their validity.”). 
 135. Id. (“The APA’s presumption of judicial review is a repudiation of the 
principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all. And there is no reason to think 
that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of 
regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity for judicial 
review . . . .”). 
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could challenge the EPA’s determination that their home site 
qualifies as a wetland under the CWA.136 Finally, Justice Alito 
wrote an aggressive concurrence attacking the “unthinkable” 
methodology of the EPA, and he strongly suggested that the core 
issue in the case was the violation of the Sacketts’ due process rights 
under the Fifth Amendment.137 Alito also chastised Congress for 
failing to clarify the issue for many years.138 
5. The Impact of Sackett on the Administrative Law Landscape 
Before Sackett, there was broad agreement that the CWA (much 
like the CAA) implicitly prohibited pre-enforcement judicial review 
of compliance orders.139 While the majority opinion ultimately rests 
on the lack of congressional intent to prohibit pre-enforcement 
review in the CWA, the due process claim made by the Sacketts 
clearly underlies the dismay expressed by the Court at the unfair 
tactics used by the EPA to avoid judicial review and coerce 
landowners into compliance.140 Alito’s concurrence serves to 
elevate the due process issue to the forefront and condemns the 
EPA’s methods in the strongest terms.141 
II. CERCLA’S PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW BAR IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Part II of this Comment argues that Sackett v. EPA 
fundamentally undercut the legal justifications that have been used 
to sustain CERCLA’s pre-enforcement review bar. First, Sackett 
renews the viability of arguments tracing their theoretical basis to Ex 
Parte Young and the notion that parties should not have to face 
devastating fines merely to challenge the validity of a UAO.142 
Second, this Part contends that the application of Mathews to 
CERCLA, as found in GE IV, is flawed and that a correct 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. at 1367. 
 137. See id. at 1375. Alito argued that the CWA: (1) is of uncertain 
jurisdictional reach; (2) imposes large penalties for noncompliance; and (3) greatly 
restricts the opportunity for judicial review. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). Based on 
these three features, he concluded that, “[i]n a nation that values due process, not 
to mention private property, such treatment is unthinkable.” Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Sackett, 
132 S. Ct. 1367. See also Rothschild, supra note 11, at 48.  
 140. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra note 137. 
 142. See infra Part II.A. 
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interpretation of Mathews militates against the current use of 
UAOs.143 Third, Part II argues that the logic of Sackett should apply 
to CERCLA and mandates a change away from the EPA’s current 
use of UAOs to address every possible CERCLA violation.144 
A. Sackett v. EPA Gives New Strength to Due Process Arguments 
Based on Ex Parte Young 
If one word could be used to characterize the due process 
arguments based on Ex Parte Young that were used by the plaintiffs 
in Solid State Circuits145 and GE IV,146 that word would probably be 
“stale.” Ex Parte Young was decided in a world that operated on 
principles and assumptions fundamentally different from those of 
the 21st century. Most importantly for the purposes of this 
Comment, federal environmental regulations of the kind embodied 
by CERCLA did not exist in 1908.147 Thus, although the principle 
that no person should have to face a damning “Hobson’s Choice” 
between facing massive fines or challenging a regulation that he or 
she knows to be illegal remains good law, cases such as GE IV and 
GE V show that courts no longer give as much weight to the due 
process considerations of Ex Parte Young.148 The results in these 
two cases are not surprising—on the one hand, the plaintiffs 
presented a case dating to the early 1900s; on the other hand, the 
EPA articulated policy objectives and administrative efficiency 
arguments pertinent to the modern world.149 It was therefore 
perfectly reasonable to find that the rule of Ex Parte Young, at least 
                                                                                                             
 143. See infra Part II.B. 
 144. See infra Part II.C. 
 145. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 146. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 118–19 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 147. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History 
of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 131 (2002) (“The 
relative lack of federal financing for local pollution control efforts in the 1960s 
reflected the low priority that federal officials placed on environmental concerns. 
In prior decades, it could be argued that Congress’ failure to appropriate money 
represented the traditional view that federal government should focus federal 
resources on truly national concerns, leaving state and local governments to fund 
state and local projects, including river cleanup.”).  
 148. See infra Part II.E. 
 149. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 19 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 
610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Jackson, 610 F.3d at 118 (“We therefore join three 
of our sister circuits that have rejected similar Ex Parte Young challenges to 
CERCLA’s UAO regime.”). 
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as it was presented in the GE cases, must bow before the demands of 
CERCLA.150 
Moreover, the original rule of Ex Parte Young has been 
progressively weakened by numerous exceptions over nearly a 
century of judicial interpretation.151 The most devastating of these 
exceptions from the viewpoint of the CERCLA-regulated party is 
surely the one recognized by the D.C. Circuit in GE V.152 In that 
case, the court found that judicial discretion over the imposition of 
fines and punitive damages completely satisfied Fifth Amendment 
due process concerns, regardless of the potential size or punitive 
nature of those damages.153 Simply put, this exception is so large 
that it “swallows the rule” of Ex Parte Young. In the context of 
environmental statutes such as CERCLA or the CWA, fines and 
penalties will never be enforced without some degree of judicial 
discretion.154 Of additional concern is the low rate at which judicial 
discretion enters into the equation at all, given the highly coercive 
nature of the EPA’s use of UAOs.155 The harsh reality is that most 
regulated parties will simply buckle to the EPA’s demands, fearing 
the outcome of a long-postponed enforcement action that could 
multiply fines and penalties into the multimillion dollar range.156 
This same problem—allowing fines to pile up while the private 
party must patiently wait for judicial review—was at the heart of the 
Supreme Court’s concern with the EPA’s conduct in Sackett v. 
EPA.157 In that case, the Sacketts had absolutely no power to initiate 
                                                                                                             
 150. See Jackson, 610 F.3d at 118. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 118 (“Courts have also held that ‘there is no constitutional violation 
if the imposition of penalties is subject to judicial discretion.’” (quoting Wagner 
Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir.1986))). 
 153. Id. at 128. 
 154. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006) (providing for civil actions under 
CERCLA); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006) (providing for civil actions under the CWA). 
Both statutes provide judicial discretion over the imposition and amount of 
statutory fines and penalties but give complete control over the timing of review to 
the EPA. See also Sackett v. E.P.A, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1372 (2012) (noting the lack 
of control regulated parties have over judicial review). 
 155. See Jackson, 610 F.3d at 128 (noting the tiny 4.6% rate of noncompliance 
in more than 1,638 CERCLA-regulated parties studied). Over the total lifespan of 
CERCLA (1982–2006), the percentage of noncompliance was an even smaller 
3.5%. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 19 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 610 
F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 156. O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 7:6. 
 157. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372 (“In Clean Water Act enforcement cases, 
judicial review ordinarily comes by way of a civil action brought by the EPA 
under 33 U.S.C. § 1319. But the Sacketts cannot initiate that process, and each day 
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the judicial review process; instead, the couple was only entitled to 
“wait and see” if the EPA would ever file an enforcement action, 
and all the while, penalties of $75,000 per day loomed over their 
heads.158 The hope that at some point within the next five years, a 
judge would consider whether those penalties were proper must 
have been small comfort to the Sacketts.159 Although the court in 
GE IV found “no hard evidence” that the EPA routinely waits the 
maximum five years before filing an enforcement action, the mere 
prospect that the EPA could wait that long creates devastating 
uncertainty.160 The essential fact remains that the Sacketts, much 
like CERCLA-regulated parties, had no control whatsoever over 
when, or even if, judicial review of their cases would occur.161 It is 
this second factor, the lack of control and excessive uncertainty of 
judicial review, that strengthens the Fifth Amendment argument 
based on Ex Parte Young. Sackett v. EPA thus makes it clear that 
massive fines are not the only problem with “non-reviewable” 
administrative orders, whether they occur under the CWA or 
CERCLA. 
B. Properly Applied, the Mathews Test Mandates Additional Access 
to Evidentiary Hearings Under CERCLA 
Despite the fact that the D.C. Circuit refused to apply the 
Mathews test in GE V,162 there is broad agreement that Mathews 
determines whether Fifth Amendment due process requires that an 
evidentiary hearing be provided by an administrative agency prior to 
                                                                                                             
 
they wait for the agency to drop the hammer, they accrue, by the Government’s 
telling, an additional $75,000 in potential liability.”). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2006) (establishing a five-year statute of 
limitations for all actions by the federal government seeking monetary damages); 
see also Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enters., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532. (W.D.N.Y. 
1984) (ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to CWA enforcement actions for civil 
penalties). Assuming that the EPA waited the maximum period to file suit against 
the Sacketts, a staggering maximum potential penalty of $136,875,000 would have 
resulted ($75,000 multiplied by 1,825 days). See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370 
(establishing a maximum penalty of $75,000 per day). 
 160. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 24. But see O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 7:6. 
(arguing that PRPs are coerced by the specter of long delays before any 
enforcement action is brought, together with the resulting daily penalties).  
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006); Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 
1372. 
 162. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011). 
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a deprivation of property.163 Therefore, the true inquiry is whether 
Mathews would require such a hearing in the context of CERCLA 
UAOs. The paradigm case applying Mathews to CERCLA UAOs 
after the 1986 SARA amendments is GE IV.164 However, the D.C. 
District Court made significant mistakes when it applied the four-
factor Mathews test.165  
1. GE IV Assigns Too Much Weight to the Risk of Erroneous 
Deprivation  
The primary error of GE IV was its application of the third factor 
of the Mathews test regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation. 
After deciding that “abstract concepts” of whether the UAO process 
is likely to be error prone are inconclusive,166 the court relied almost 
entirely on the evidence produced by GE in discovery.167 Based on 
this data, the court concluded that the rate of error in UAOs issued 
under CERCLA in the study period was less than or equal to 4.4%, a 
rate that it deemed acceptable.168 The court assumed that where the 
risk of error is small, the risk of harm is equivalently small; but in 
the CERCLA context, this approach creates inequitable results.169 
As the GE IV court admitted, “CERCLA-regulated party” is a term 
with a very broad reach, covering some individuals as well as many 
businesses of every size and description.170 Although some of these 
regulated parties, such as the General Electric Co. in GE IV, clearly 
have the financial strength to survive the financial and reputational 
damage inflicted by an erroneous UAO, many do not.171 As the 
court noted, even one UAO is sufficient to bankrupt many smaller 
                                                                                                             
 163. See, e.g., id. The court would have applied Mathews but for its ruling that 
GE had no constitutionally protected property interest under the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. See also Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 20–22; Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. 
Supp. 69, 74 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
 164. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 20–38. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 33–35 (“Therefore, although several aspects of the pre-UAO 
issuance process suggest, in the abstract, a high risk of error, others suggest neither 
a high nor a low risk of error, and still others suggest a low risk of error.”). 
 167. See id. at 35–37. 
 168. Id. at 37. 
 169. Id. at 30 (“UAOs could put some PRPs out of business. For other PRPs, 
UAOs may affect operations, like whether to bid for new projects or to hire 
additional employees.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., id. 
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businesses, even if the expected response costs fall short of GE’s 
claimed figure of $4 million.172 
Another problem with the GE IV court’s approach to erroneous 
deprivation is the weight given to the statistical data produced by 
GE.173 In effect, the court allowed the risk of erroneous deprivation 
to control the result in GE IV and used a specific subset of the data 
provided by GE to establish the risk of error in CERCLA UAOs.174 
Instead of basing its conclusion on such a narrow set of data, which 
pertained only to GE, the GE IV court should have considered the 
broader effects of the UAO enforcement scheme on all regulated 
parties.175 As the Supreme Court noted in Mathews, “[b]are statistics 
rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decision-
making process.”176 Such statistics are an even less reliable test of 
due process fairness when they only pertain to a particular party in a 
particular case.177 
The net effect of the district court’s ruling in GE IV is to allow 
data produced by GE to determine the due process rights of all other 
CERCLA-regulated parties, regardless of their size, situation, or 
relative means. Big, multinational companies like GE are thus 
lumped together with much smaller businesses, leading to punishing 
results for those relatively tiny companies. Because of the post-
SARA ban on constitutional challenges against individual UAOs,178 
only broad facial challenges against the UAO enforcement scheme 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. at 38 (“If the PRP complies, then the average costs of compliance are 
$4 million and the deprivation lasts for an average of three years.”). 
 173. See id. at 35–37. 
 174. Id. at 37 (“In sum, when all four categories of evidence proffered by GE 
are carefully scrutinized, GE has pointed to just five instances of error—four 
examples from specific sites described in GE’s declarations and one example of a 
complying PRP successfully obtaining reimbursement from the government.”). 
 175. See id. at 28–30. Of the evidence provided by GE, the most important 
measure is surely the paltry 4.6% of regulated parties who actually chose not to 
comply with a UAO during the study period. See also O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 
7:6 (“Because the risks, in terms of increased costs or penalties, are often too great 
for PRPs to refuse to settle with the Agency in the hope of later challenging EPA’s 
remedy, PRPs frequently agree to perform EPA-selected work even when they 
have strong arguments that the Agency’s remedy is inappropriate.”). 
 176. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976). 
 177. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 37. 
 178. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006) (creating the current pre-enforcement 
review bar); O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 7:5 (“[Section] 113(h) bars judicial 
review of an EPA removal or remedial action until the Agency has taken some 
enforcement action . . . .”); see also Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 72 
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that judicial review of facial constitutional challenges to 
CERCLA was not precluded). 
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in general will ever be possible.179 Further, since only the largest 
regulated parties can afford to mount lengthy constitutional 
challenges to CERCLA, the interests of smaller entities will not be 
adequately represented.180 Therefore, as long as these broad 
challenges are based on data collected by individual plaintiffs, as in 
the GE cases, the results will be skewed and detrimentally affect 
many smaller regulated parties who cannot bear the cost of such 
litigation.181  
2. Sackett v. EPA Supports Aminoil’s Conclusion That the 
Public Interest Weighs Against the Pre-Enforcement Review Bar 
Although the GE IV opinion does contain a detailed segment 
dedicated to balancing the other three factors with one another,182 it 
ultimately neglects to properly consider the “public interest” factor 
listed by the Supreme Court in Mathews.183 For a proper analysis of 
the public interest at stake in CERCLA, it is necessary to look 
instead to Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S. EPA in which the court did attempt 
to define and weigh the public interest factor.184 In Aminoil, the 
court did not discount the “significant” interest of the public and 
government in prompt handling of toxic waste disasters but ruled 
that some “rudimentary” due process protections could be provided 
to regulated parties without greatly compromising CERCLA’s 
goals.185  
As noted by the D.C. District Court in GE IV, there are other, 
more “rudimentary” options for ensuring due process, besides full 
trials before an Article III court.186 Such options include 
administrative hearings, whether before an ALJ or a presiding 
                                                                                                             
 179. See Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (holding that judicial review of 
facial constitutional challenges to CERCLA was not precluded); see also Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2959 (2011) (noting that even after SARA and the addition of CERCLA section 
113(h), a facial constitutional challenge against CERCLA is not prohibited, so 
long as it “does not challenge any particular action or order by EPA”). 
 180. See, e.g., Jackson, 610 F.3d 110. By the time GE’s petition for certiorari 
was denied by the Supreme Court in 2011, GE’s constitutional challenge had been 
in near constant litigation for more than ten years. 
 181. See supra note 169, 175. 
 182. See Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 37–39. 
 183. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 347 (1976) (“In striking the 
appropriate due process balance the final factor to be assessed is the public 
interest.”). 
 184. Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 75–76 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
 185. Id. at 76. 
 186. See, e.g., Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 38. 
2014] COMMENT 1289 
 
 
 
officer.187 Unlike Aminoil, however, the GE IV court ultimately 
concluded that the additional costs imposed by even administrative 
hearings could not be justified.188 Wholly accepting the EPA’s 
efficiency-based arguments, the D.C. District Court found that 
forcing the Agency to provide any kind of evidentiary hearing 
would impermissibly frustrate the goals of CERCLA enforcement as 
contemplated by Congress.189 GE IV thus stands for the principle 
that the pre-enforcement review bar in CERCLA must be upheld 
against due process challenges to protect the EPA’s administrative 
efficiency.190 
Despite the court’s decision in GE IV, the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Sackett v. EPA provides strong evidence that Aminoil was 
fundamentally correct, at least in terms of the Mathews public policy 
balance.191 Like Aminoil,192 the majority opinion in Sackett 
expressed grave concern with the coercive effects of non-reviewable 
administrative orders.193 However, Sackett went even further than 
Aminoil and rejected the substance of the EPA’s efficiency-based 
arguments for the maintenance of a pre-enforcement review bar.194 
Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejected the notion that 
non-reviewable orders are essential to the EPA’s enforcement 
efforts.195 Instead, he argued that administrative orders will continue 
to be an effective mechanism for enforcement, wherever they are 
essentially correct and supported by the weight of evidence.196 
                                                                                                             
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 38–39. 
 189. Id. at 36–38. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See supra Part I.E; Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 76 (C.D. Cal. 
1984). 
 192. Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. Supp. at 76. 
 193. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1373–74 (2012). 
 194. Id. at 1374 (“Finally, the Government notes that Congress passed the 
Clean Water Act in large part to respond to the inefficiency of then-existing 
remedies for water pollution. Compliance orders, as noted above, can obtain quick 
remediation through voluntary compliance. The Government warns that the EPA 
is less likely to use the orders if they are subject to judicial review. That may be 
true—but it will be true for all agency actions subjected to judicial review.”). 
 195. See, e.g., id.  
 196. Id. (“Compliance orders will remain an effective means of securing 
prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no substantial 
basis to question their validity.”). 
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C. UAOs Must Not Be the EPA’s Default Method of CERCLA 
Enforcement  
Under CERCLA section 106, the EPA has three different 
options for enforcement: (1) conduct the cleanup itself and sue for 
compensation; (2) bring an enforcement action in district court; or 
(3) issue a UAO against a potentially responsible party (PRP) 
charging a violation of CERCLA.197 When it passed CERCLA, 
Congress created a range of enforcement choices to suit different 
kinds of pollution emergencies.198 For example, option one, in 
which the EPA conducts the cleanup itself, is ideally suited for 
environmental catastrophes that pose such an imminent threat that 
the government simply cannot wait for a PRP to conduct its own 
cleanup.199 While this still does occasionally occur, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, issuance of a UAO is the only 
response chosen by the EPA to enforce CERCLA.200 
In effect, UAOs have become a kind of “super order” that 
renders every other alternative enforcement mechanism largely 
irrelevant.201 The reasons for this development are not difficult to 
grasp—the EPA enjoys complete insulation from judicial review for 
up to five years when using UAOs.202 Further, the practice of 
allowing fees to accrue pending some hypothetical enforcement 
action in the future creates a level of coercion that cannot be 
matched by the other two alternatives under CERCLA section 
106.203 
                                                                                                             
 197. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2006). 
 198. See id. § 9606(a); Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. Supp. at 71 (“Congress plainly 
gave the President authority to address situations endangering ‘public health and 
welfare and the environment,’ and such authority necessitates broad flexibility in 
promptly and effectively responding to the emergency.” (citations omitted)). 
 199. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 32 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 610 
F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“In true emergency situations, EPA cleans up a site 
itself and later files a cost recovery action.”). 
 200. See id. at 33 (noting the vast number of UAOs issued over the existence 
of CERCLA). “Between August 16, 1982 and May 25, 2006—a period of 285 
months—EPA issued 1,705 UAOs to more than 5,400 PRPs. On average, then, 
EPA has issued approximately six UAOs to nineteen PRPs every month.” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). The court also notes that, over the same period, only 
3.5% of PRPs chose noncompliance, meaning that the EPA only had to file some 
189 enforcement actions under CERCLA section 106. See id. at 28. 
 201. See, e.g., id. 
 202. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (establishing a five-year statute of limitations for all 
actions by the federal government seeking monetary damages); see also Friends of 
the Earth v. Facet Enterprises, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.Y.1984) (ruling that 
28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to CWA enforcement actions for civil penalties). 
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b); Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 32. 
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The Court in Sackett v. EPA ruled against an identical 
enforcement structure under the CWA, arguing that administrative 
orders (such as UAOs) are still useful to the EPA, even if they are 
subject to judicial review.204 The reasoning used by Justice Scalia to 
support this conclusion, namely that the great majority of orders will 
not be challenged because they are factually correct, is actually 
supported by the evidence analyzed by the GE IV court.205 There is 
no reason to believe that the EPA’s methods of investigation and 
enforcement differ greatly between the CWA and CERCLA.206 
Thus, there is simply no reason why the Court’s conclusion in 
Sackett v. EPA should not also apply to CERCLA. Therefore, even 
if UAOs are made subject to judicial review, it is likely that the EPA 
will still be able to obtain quick compliance in a majority of 
cases.207  
III. THE ALJ SOLUTION 
In Sackett, the Court proposed one potential solution to the 
problem of non-reviewable compliance orders—allowing pre-
enforcement judicial review.208 However, there is another 
possibility—a solution founded upon the very structure of 
administrative law. This Comment argues that the best available 
means of satisfying the requirements of Fifth Amendment due 
process is the use of adjudications or hearings presided over by 
ALJs.209 Agency hearings are typically much more informal and 
                                                                                                             
 204. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012). 
 205. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011). The evidence collected by GE in GE V showed 
that only around 4.6% of parties issued a UAO by the EPA in the study period did 
not comply with that order. Id. As the GE V court noted, there is a strong 
possibility that the low level of noncompliance observed was due in large part to 
most of the UAOs being correct. Id. 
 206. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372–73. CWA compliance orders are 
functionally the same as CERCLA UAOs. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2006), 
with 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006). They are used for the same purpose—to obtain 
compliance from regulated parties. Id. In both cases, fines for noncompliance are 
calculated from the date the orders are issued. Id. Until recently, both were also 
immune from pre-enforcement judicial review. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372–73. 
 207. See Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (finding that the average time for 
cleanup of a CERCLA waste site is eight years). Although the court did not 
provide a separate average for those parties who choose noncompliance, it is 
logical to assume that the average time to clean up sites owned by noncomplying 
PRPs is substantially longer, on account of lengthy legal challenges. Id. 
 208. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374. 
 209. See infra Part III.A–B. 
1292 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
thus much less costly than Article III trials.210 Like Article III 
judges, ALJs are neutral decision-makers.211 However, unlike 
federal judges, ALJs possess specialized training in their respective 
fields, allowing them to accurately assess the validity of the complex 
scientific evidence that is crucial to CERCLA cases. Additionally, 
hearings can be completed in a relatively short amount of time, 
especially when compared to Article III trials.212 In adjudications, 
both parties have the chance to present their evidence and make 
arguments before a neutral decision-maker who is not controlled by 
the administrative agency.213  
Allowing a PRP to contest a UAO at an early date would 
alleviate many of the devastating financial consequences identified 
by the D.C. District Court in GE IV.214 The increased certainty 
provided by a swift and fair ALJ adjudication should reduce 
damaging fluctuations in stock price and serve to reassure a PRP’s 
creditors and investors.215 Finally, the use of an ALJ would satisfy 
Fifth Amendment due process requirements under Mathews v. 
Eldridge because it would provide a meaningful opportunity for 
PRPs to confront the evidence against them and present any 
available defenses to CERCLA liability.216 
A. Proposed Procedure for CERCLA Administrative Hearings 
To complete the proposed ALJ solution to due process 
deficiencies in CERCLA UAOs, this Comment proposes both 
procedures and effective remedies to facilitate administrative 
hearings. For ALJ adjudication to form an effective alternative to 
Article III courts, ALJs must have broad powers to resolve disputes 
over all parts of the UAO regime, including whether issuance was 
proper, the appropriate scope of the UAO, and what cleanup 
                                                                                                             
 210. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 38; Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 
76 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
 211. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 32–33 (“[C]ourts have held that an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and a detached “presiding officer” within an 
agency, are both adequate neutral decision-makers.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 212. Id. at 38. Another option discussed by the GE IV court is a hearing before 
a presiding officer, a neutral Agency employee with decision-making power. See 
id. at 32–33. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 36–38. 
 215. E.g., id. Although GE IV resolved the balance of interests in favor of 
preserving the pre-enforcement bar, the court acknowledged that PRPs would 
greatly benefit from early review of some type. Id. 
 216. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
2014] COMMENT 1293 
 
 
 
activities should be required. Fully addressing these issues demands 
a multi-stage procedural approach to each challenged UAO. 
First, the ALJ must examine all the relevant evidence provided 
by the EPA in support of the UAO, together with any evidence 
submitted by the regulated party.217 Because CERCLA imposes 
strict liability, most defenses would likely revolve around whether 
the toxic substance allegedly released falls under CERCLA or 
whether contamination was caused by an act of God or other 
unforeseeable cause, such as sabotage by a third party.218 At this 
stage, the ALJ would employ his or her vast experience, drawn from 
deciding countless similar disputes, to quickly sort through the 
scientific evidence and determine whether the UAO was properly 
issued and whether the alleged violation falls within the scope of 
CERCLA.219 This faster speed of resolution would greatly reduce 
the time for large, daily fines to run against the PRP and would 
make contesting the UAO an economically viable solution.220 
If the ALJ is satisfied that the evidence supports the issuance of 
the UAO, then the ALJ could proceed to the next stage—
determining the proper scope of that UAO. In most cases, this 
second step should be quite brief. If the EPA has provided the 
appropriate scientific justification for issuance of the UAO, the 
Agency should be afforded some level of deference on its 
determination of scope. Because the ALJ has no first-hand 
experience of the pollution problem, the ALJ must give deference to 
the testimony and reports of EPA investigators. However, such 
                                                                                                             
 217. Although this process may seem unfairly weighted in favor of the 
Agency, the requirement that all evidence be presented is in fact the best guarantee 
of fairness. Through this process, the EPA would be forced to substantiate all 
charges at an early stage and would be dissuaded from issuing a UAO prematurely 
on scant evidence. Note that currently, all CERCLA requires for the issuance of a 
UAO is the administrator’s “belief” that a violation has occurred, on the basis of 
“any information available.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (2006). The effect of this 
change, if effectively implemented, would be to force the administrator to consider 
whether the information presented to him is reliable enough to survive review by 
an ALJ. Id. 
 218. See Glass, supra note 46, at 395. 
 219. The depth of experience developed by ALJs hearing CERCLA UAO 
challenges is a primary difference between ALJs and Article III judges and is 
essential to the efficient resolution of such claims. See, e.g., Martin v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Com’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991) (noting 
the depth of expertise administrative agencies develop in interpreting and applying 
their own regulations). 
 220. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 38 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 
610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (establishing an average deprivation of $4 million 
for three years to PRPs under the current CERCLA enforcement regime for a 
single UAO). 
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deference should not be absolute. Where regulated parties can 
substantially rebut the EPA’s contentions through competent 
evidence of their own, the ALJ should be cognizant of the 
possibility that the scope of the UAO may need to be reduced.221 
The last stage of an ALJ’s examination of a UAO should be the 
degree and kind of cleanup required. Much like the second step, this 
third phase should receive considerable deference in the great 
majority of cases. Only where the record reveals a significant 
disparity between the risks posed by contamination and the extent of 
the proposed cleanup should the ALJ consider altering the terms of 
the UAO. 
B. Proposed Administrative Remedies for ALJ Review of UAOs 
This Comment proposes that an effective regime of ALJ 
adjudications must have meaningful remedies at its disposal to solve 
the current due process deficiencies in CERCLA’s UAO 
enforcement scheme. Essentially, ALJs should have access to three 
basic remedies when confronting a challenged UAO: (1) accept and 
endorse the order as it stands, (2) reject it for insufficient evidence, 
or (3) modify its terms. These three options will be addressed in 
turn. 
The first option, to accept and endorse the UAO as issued, 
should be the result whenever the EPA can produce sufficient 
scientific evidence to support the UAO. There is little reason to 
believe that endorsement would not be the “default option” for most 
cases that come before an ALJ. Because the efficiency and cost 
savings of the ALJ system depend, at least in part, on greatly relaxed 
rules of procedure, a formal standard of proof for the EPA cannot 
and should not be imposed on ALJ adjudications. Nevertheless, this 
Comment proposes that the ALJ should examine scientific evidence 
and hear testimony from both sides whenever it is available and that 
the ALJ should adjudicate the case using something approaching a 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof generally applied 
to civil actions.222 Thus, whenever the EPA’s evidence presents a 
                                                                                                             
 221. As a hypothetical example, assume the EPA produces investigative 
reports alleging toxic contamination of three of the PRP’s industrial facilities. 
However, the PRP commissions a thorough, independent scientific evaluation that 
reveals only two of the properties are contaminated by measureable amounts of 
toxin. In this scenario, the ALJ should properly limit the scope of the UAO to the 
two contaminated properties. 
 222. It must be emphasized that ALJs cannot and should not be constrained to 
a single approach. Other standards of proof may well be appropriate in individual 
cases. This flexibility forms a large part of the ALJ system’s appeal.  
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more plausible version of events, the UAO should stand as issued. 
Through this process, a record would undoubtedly be produced―a 
record that would greatly assist the EPA in forcing settlement of the 
many clear-cut cases identified by the court in GE IV.223 This benefit 
to the EPA must not be minimized; by producing a clear record of 
all the available evidence at an early stage, the clarity of the facts 
would force many (if not the majority of) cases into settlement, 
avoiding costly litigation. 
The second option for an ALJ examining a UAO must be 
rejection for insufficient evidence. The possibility that a UAO could 
be rejected, no matter how unlikely, gives real teeth to the role of the 
ALJ adjudication as a means of protecting regulated parties’ due 
process rights.224 Clearly, some impetus is also needed to encourage 
the EPA to be careful about when and how it issues UAOs. 
Rejection would provide this impetus and serve as a warning that 
UAOs based on merely speculative evidence will not be tolerated. 
Of course, such power should be used sparingly. 
The third and final remedy available to an ALJ should be 
modification of the challenged UAO. As a remedy, modification is 
necessitated by the reality that either the scope or proposed cleanup 
responsibilities contained in a challenged UAO may be incorrect. 
For these cases, efficiency dictates an intermediate remedy, which is 
neither approval nor complete rejection of the UAO. In such cases, 
the ALJ could effectively resolve the dispute and protect the 
interests of both the EPA and the regulated party by modifying the 
terms of the UAO.225 
Overall, the efficiency of the ALJ solution to the due process 
deficiencies of CERCLA UAOs depends greatly on the availability 
of effective remedies. Without such powers, any adjudication would 
be a fruitless exercise and no help to those adversely affected by an 
improper UAO. Moreover, through careful use of the remedies 
proposed by this Comment, an ALJ can actually aid the EPA by 
producing a complete factual record at an early stage of the dispute. 
When this record reflects that the EPA has correctly issued a UAO, 
                                                                                                             
 223. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011) (noting the strong likelihood that the 
overwhelming rate of compliance with UAOs indicates that most of them are 
fundamentally correct). 
 224. See supra note 217. 
 225. Modification would most likely be in favor of the regulated party, but it 
need not always be so. Where the facts reveal that the challenged UAO is in fact 
too narrow, the ALJ should retain the power to expand its terms or geographic 
reach. In this way, ALJ adjudications can actually assist the EPA in the efficient 
administration of CERCLA. 
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the ALJ adjudication would serve to compel swift settlement and 
reduce the need for costly litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
After Sackett v. EPA, courts should find that CERCLA’s non-
reviewable UAOs violate the Fifth Amendment due process rights 
of regulated parties. Striking down the prohibition on pre-
enforcement review of UAOs will not destroy either CERCLA or 
the EPA. Instead, with a well-established and efficient ALJ process 
in place, regulated parties would be able to effectively assert their 
rights in the face of contested UAOs and quickly obtain guidance 
from a qualified, neutral decision-maker. The speedy resolution of 
claims by ALJs would undoubtedly reduce litigation expenses for all 
parties. Ultimately, the size of CERCLA fines and even their 
necessity as a means of coercing compliance should diminish. As 
the court stated in Mathews, “[t]he essence of due process is the 
requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) 
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’”226 
Through the proposed administrative hearings, regulated parties in 
jeopardy of devastating CERCLA fines would finally gain an 
opportunity to contest the EPA’s charges against them. 
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